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Courts have been struggling to determine the proper grounds for the issuance of an ”injunction
against honor. The purpose of this Note is to analyze exactly which circumstances warrant an
injunction against honor. Part I will discuss the origin and development of the relevant law in this
area. Part II will analyze those situations in which courts have had to consider issuing injunctions
due to active fraud in the underlying transaction. Part III will explore the issue of prospective fraud
as a ground for enjoining honor which was raised in the recent Iranian letter of credit litigation.
LETTERS OF CREDIT:
EXPLORING THE BOUNDARIES OF
INJUNCTIONS AGAINST HONOR
INTRODUCTION
Letters of credit have consistently played an important role in
the financing of trade from as far back as the time of the Phoeni-
cians, Babylonians, Assyrians and Greeks.' While letters of credit
1. Wiley, How to Use Letters of Credit in Financing the Sale of Goods, 20 Bus.
LAW. 495, 495 (1965). In general, there are two types of letters of credit: the com-
mercial letter of credit and the standby letter of credit. In all letter of credit situa-
tions there are three parties: the customer who requests that a letter of credit be is-
sued; the issuer, most likely a bank, who issues the letter upon the customer's
request; and the beneficiary, who is the party entitled to demand payment under the
letter of credit. Comment, Letters of Credit: Current Theories and Usages, 39 LA. L.
REV. 581, 581-85, 609 (1979).
The operation of a commercial letter of credit is best illustrated by an example.
A New York merchant, M, decides that he needs one thousand mink coats for his
winter line. M contacts a Canadian seller, S, offering to buy a thousand mink coats.
M does not mention payment in his offer. Since S has not dealt with M before and
therefore knows nothing about M's honesty or solvency, S does not wish to sell on an
open account. S suggests that M pay in advance. M, of course, does not wish to pay
for goods not yet delivered. Subsequently a letter of credit sale is agreed to by the
parties.
M requests his bank (which is large and reputable) to issue a commercial letter
of credit naming S as the beneficiary. The bank then promises to pay S the contract
price upon receiving specified documents. Such documents might include a bill of
lading, or a signed statement from a neutral party that the goods have arrived in a
particular location and are in order. The bank will then look to M for reimbursement
as well as a finance charge payment pursuant to a security contract between M and
the bank. If the bank's payment to the beneficiary has been proper (i.e., if the bank
has received proper documentation) M's duty to reimburse the bank is absolute. J.
WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE COMMERCIAL CODE
§ 18-9 (2d ed. 1980).
The standby letter of credit, on the other hand, differs from the commercial let-
ter of credit in that the issuer will pay the beneficiary a certain amount upon docu-
mentation stating that its customer has defaulted on the underlying contract. A devel-
oper, for example, contracts with a construction company to build an office building.
The construction company demands assurance that it will be paid in full upon com-
pletion of the building and insists that the developer obtain a standby letter of credit
which will make payment available in the event the developer defaults. The devel-
oper may also insist that the construction company secure a standby letter of credit
in its favor which would provide for liquidated damages in the event that the con-
struction company defaults in its performance.
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have financed a vast majority of recent United States merchandise
imports,2 these instruments have become the subject of contro-
versy in the courts during the past forty years. 3 In this controversy
the courts have been struggling to determine the proper grounds
for the issuance of an "injunction against honor." 4 Indeed, recent
banking litigation, 5 fomented by the current international difficul-
ties caused by the Iranian revolution, has focused attention on this
subject. 6 Unfortunately, the lack of a well-defined legal doctrine
concerning injunctions against honor has resulted in judicial con-
fusion. 7
The purpose of this Note is to analyze exactly which circum-
stances warrant an injunction against honor. Part I will discuss the
origin and development of the relevant law in this area. Part II
will analyze those situations in which courts have had to consider
issuing injunctions due to active fraud in the underlying transac-
tion. Part III will explore the issue of prospective fraud as a ground
for enjoining honor which was raised in the recent Iranian letter of
credit litigation. 8
Since parties do not expect to be in default, it is not intended that payment will
be made under a standby letter of credit. In a commercial letter of credit situation,
however, it is fully expected that payment will be made under the letter. This is the
major difference between the two. See Comment, Letters of Credit: Current Theo-
ries and Usages, 39 LA. L. REV. 581, 581-85, 609-13 (1979). For a complete analysis
of the operation of a letter of credit, see Kozolchyk, Legal Aspects of Letters of
Credit and Related Secured Transactions, 11 LAW. AM. 265 (1979).
2. 2 W. HAWKLAND, A TRANSACTIONAL GUIDE TO THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE 791 (1964); Annot., 35 A.L.R.3d 1404, 1407 (1971).
3. See, e.g., Venizelos, S.A. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 425 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.
1970); Watkins-Johnson Co. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. C79-0121 (N.D. Cal. Feb.
27, 1979); Sztejn v. Schroder Banking Corp., 177 Misc. 719, 31 N.Y.S.2d 631 (Sup.
Ct. 1941).
4. See, e.g., Venizelos, S.A. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 425 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.
1970); Watkins-Johnson Co. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. C79-0121 (N.D. Cal. Feb.
27, 1979); Sztejn v. Schroder Banking Corp., 177 Misc. 719, 31 N.Y.S.2d 631 (Sup.
Ct. 1941). An injunction against honor is an injunction prohibiting the issuer from
making payment under a letter of credit. See U.C.C. § 5-114.
5. See, e.g., Werner Lehara Int'l, Inc. v. Harris Trust & Sav. Bank, 484 F.
Supp. 65 (W.D. Mich. 1980); Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. Bank Melli Iran, No.
48411 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 1979); American Bell Int'l, Inc. v. Manufacturers Hanover
Trust Co., No. 3157/79 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co., N.Y. Mar. 26, 1979).
6. Rendell, The Iranian Revolution Continues in the Courts, EUROMONEY,
June 1979, at 73-75; Comment, Enjoining the International Letter of Credit: The
Iranian Letter of Credit Cases, 21 HARV. INT'L L.J. 189 (1980).
7. Compare United Bank Ltd. v. Cambridge Sporting Goods Corp. with Dy-
namics Corp. of America v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank. See notes 33-44 infra and ac-
companying text.
8. See, e.g., Werner Lehara Int'l, Inc. v. Harris Trust & Sav. Bank, 484 F.
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I. THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF
THE LAW GOVERNING INJUNCTIONS AGAINST HONOR
A. The Independent Contracts Rule
Historically it has been a cardinal principle of commercial law
that a bank issuing a letter of credit need not concern itself with the
underlying transaction between its customer and the beneficiary. 9
The issuing bank concerns itself only with whether the beneficiary
has provided it with the documents required under the letter and
not whether the beneficiary has properly performed its contractual
duties in the underlying transaction. 10 This rule, referred to as the
independent contracts rule," provides for payment of the letter of
credit upon objective documentation criteria, without which the
parties might not transact business at all.12
The independent contracts rule, however, can produce an in-
equitable result when the transaction is tainted by the beneficiary's
fraud. 13 As a result, an exception to the rule of independent con-
tracts was carved out in the landmark case of Sztejn v. J. Henry
Schroder Banking Corp.14
In Sztejn, the seller-beneficiary intentionally failed to ship the
goods ordered by the buyer-customer. The seller-beneficiary
shipped "worthless rubbish," obtained the documentation required
under the letter of credit nonetheless, and subsequently demanded
that the issuer make payment.15 The buyer-customer sought an in-
junction prohibiting the bank from making payment under the letter
Supp. 65 (W.D. Mich. 1980); Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. Bank Melli Iran, No.
48411 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 1979); American Bell Int'l, Inc. v. Manufacturers Hanover
Trust Co., No. 3157/79 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co., N.Y. Mar. 26, 1979).
9. See Venizelos, S.A. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 425 F.2d 461, 464-65 (2d Cir.
1970); H. HARFIELD, BANK CREDITS AND ACCEPTANCES 31-32 (5th ed. 1974).
10. See Venizelos, S.A. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 425 F.2d 461, 464-65 (2d Cir.
1970); H. HARFIELD, BANK CREDITS AND ACCEPTANCES 31-32 (5th ed. 1974).
11. H. HARFIELD, supra note 9, at 31-32.
12. See note 1 supra.
13. See, e.g., Sztejn v. J. Henry Schroder Banking Corp., 177 Misc. 719, 720-23, 31
N.Y.S.2d 631, 632-35 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
14. 177 Misc. 719, 31 N.Y.S.2d 631 (Sup. Ct. 1941). Although this case was not
decided by New York State's highest court, it is followed by courts throughout this
country as well as abroad. See, e.g., Intraworld Indus., Inc. v. Girard Trust Bank, 461
Pa. 343, 359, 336 A.2d 316, 325 (1975). Edward Owen Eng'r, Ltd. v. Barclays Bank,
[19771 1 W.L.R. 764, 764. The latter case was decided by the Court of Appeal of
England and Wales. See also Kozolchyk, supra note 1, at 281.
15. 177 Misc. at 720-21, 31 N.Y.S.2d at 633.
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(an injunction against honor).16 The court granted the injunction
and stated that where there has been active and intentional fraud
in the performance of the beneficiary's duty to the customer, a
court may make an exception to the independent contracts rule
and enjoin the issuer from making payment despite proper docu-
mentation.' 7 The Sztejn court held that breach of warranty con-
cerning the quality of the merchandise was not sufficient cause to
enjoin honor but rather it must be shown that the unscrupulous
beneficiary actively and intentionally defrauded the buyer.',,
B. Applicable Law
Analysis of the law governing the issuance of an injunction
against honor focuses almost exclusively on case law rather than
statutory law. This is true despite the fact that section 5-114 of the
Uniform Commercial Code states the grounds for injunctions
against honor. 19 The broad wording of this section-that a court
16. See note 4 supra.
17. 177 Misc. at 720-23, 31 N.Y.S.2d at 632-35.
18. See id.
19. U.C.C. § 5-114 (1978 version). This section provides:
Issuer's Duty and Privilege to Honor; Right to Reimbursement
(1) An issuer must honor a draft or demand for payment which complies
with the terms of the relevant credit regardless of whether the goods or doc-
uments conform to the underlying contract for sale or other contract between
the customer and the beneficiary. The issuer is not excused from honor of
such a draft or demand by reason of an additional general term that all docu-
ments must be satisfactory to the issuer, but an issuer may require that
specified documents must be satisfactory to it.
(2) Unless otherwise agreed when documents appear on their face to
comply with the terms of a credit but a required document does not in fact
conform to the warranties made on negotiation or transfer of a document of
title (Section 7-507) or of a security (Section 8-306) or is forged or fraudulent
or there is fraud in the transaction
(a) the issuer must honor the draft or demand for payment if honor is
demanded by a negotiating bank or other holder of the draft or de-
mand which has taken the draft or demand under the credit and un-
der circumstances which would make it a holder in due course (Sec-
tion 3-302) and in an appropriate case would make it a person to
whom a document of title has been duly negotiated (Section 7-502)
or a bona fide purchaser of a security (Section 8-302); and
(b) in all other cases as against its customer, an issuer acting in good
faith may honor the draft or demand for payment despite notifica-
tion from the customer of fraud, forgery or other defect not apparent
on the face of the documents but a court of appropriate jurisdiction
may enjoin such honor.
(3) Unless otherwise agreed an issuer which has duly honored a draft or
INJUNCTIONS AGAINST HONOR
may enjoin honor when there is "fraud in the transaction" 2 0-
makes it necessary for a court to review prior case law to deter-
mine the types of situations in which honor should be enjoined. 21
New York, the situs of the majority of the letter of credit trade
and litigation, 22 added a subsection to section 5-102 of the U.C.C.
which states that the U.C.C. shall not apply to a letter of credit if
by the terms of the letter, usage of the trade, or course of dealing,
the letter is subject, in whole or in part, to the Uniform Customs
and Practice Act (U.C.P.).2 3 Since it is customary for letters of
credit to state that they are subject to the U.C.P., 24 this further
reduces the instances in which the U.C.C. may be relied upon as
authority. The U.C.P., however, is simply a recording of the prac-
tices and procedures followed in the commercial world and not a
compilation of legal rules,2 5 and as such does not govern the issu-
ance of an injunction. 26 Thus, case law rather than statutory law
governs the issuance of injunctions against honor.
An injunction is an extraordinary, equitable remedy with spe-
cific requirements which the plaintiff must satisfy before an injunc-
tion will issue.2 7 The requirements are that: 1) the plaintiff has
shown a strong probability of success on the merits; 2) the plaintiff
will suffer irreparable injury absent an injunction; and 3) the public
demand for payment is entitled to immediate reimbursement of any pay-
ment made under the credit and to be put in effectively available funds not
later than the day before maturity of any acceptance made under the credit.
Id.
20. Id. § 5-114(2).
21. See, e.g., Werner Lehara Int'l, Inc. v. Harris Trust & Sav. Bank, 484 F. Supp.
65, 73 (W.D. Mich. 1980); Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. Bank Melli Iran, No.
48411, slip op. at 9 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 1979); American Bell Int'l, Inc. v. Manu-
facturers Hanover Trust Co., No. 3157/79, slip op. at 8, 10 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co., N.Y.
Mar. 26, 1979).
22. T. QUINN, U.C.C. COMMENTARY AND LAW DIGEST § 5-101 [A][1][a] (1978).
23. N.Y. U.C.C. § 5-102(4) (McKinney). See INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF
COMMERCE, THE UNIFORM CUSTOMS AND PRACTICES ACT (publication no. 290, 1974
version) reprinted in T. QUINN, supra note 22, § 5-117[D].
The U.C.C. is not a federal statute and must be adopted by a state (which may
amend any section of the Code) before it has the force of law. J. WHITE & R. SUM-
MERS, supra note 1, § 1.
24. See T. QUINN, supra note 22, § 5-101[A][1][a].
25. American Bell Int'l, Inc. v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., No. 3157/79,
slip op. at 10 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co., N.Y. Mar. 26, 1979).
26. Id. at 9-10.
27. Werner Lehara Int'l, Inc. v. Harris Trust & Sav. Bank, 484 F. Supp. 65, 72-76
(W.D. Mich. 1980).
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interest will be served by the issuance of an injunction.2 8 In
deciding injunction against honor cases, the courts concentrate al-
most exclusively on the public interest requirements. 29 The factors
which are weighed in the public interest test are the need to pro-
tect an innocent plaintiff from being defrauded by an unscrupulous
beneficiary on the one hand, and the need to protect the indepen-
dence of the issuer's obligation from the underlying transaction on
the other.30
II. THE CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER WHICH HONOR
HAS BEEN ENJOINED-FRAUD IN THE
UNDERLYING TRANSACTION
The landmark 1941 Sztejn case 31 still remains the guiding light
for courts in deciding injunction against honor cases. 32 A more re-
cent case, United Bank Ltd. v. Cambridge Sporting Goods
Corp., a3 is quite similar to Sztejn. In United Bank a New York
buyer ordered 27,000 leather boxing gloves from a Pakistani seller.
The seller was the beneficiary of a letter of credit which was issued
by the buyer's bank and was payable upon specified documenta-
tion. The gloves which were shipped were unpadded, ripped,
badly mildewed and definitely not what the buyer ordered. The
Pakistani seller nonetheless provided the bank with the specified
documents and demanded payment. 34 The court stated that, al-
though mere breach of warranty was not sufficient to enjoin pay-
ment and the line between objections based on the quality of
goods and objections based on fraud was sometimes thin, the
worthless fragments of leather which the beneficiary shipped evi-
denced fraud rather than breach of warranty. 35 Therefore, the
court enjoined the bank from honoring its letter.36
Dynamics Corp. of America v. Citizens & Southern National
Bank37 is another case in which honor was enjoined. In this case
28. Id.
29. See, e.g., notes 45-51 infra and accompanying text.
30. Id.
31. Sztejn v. J. Henry Schroder Banking Corp., 177 Misc. 719, 30 N.Y.S.2d 631
(Sup. Ct. 1941).
32. See note 14 supra.
33. 41 N.Y.2d 254, 360 N.E.2d 943, 392 N.Y.S.2d 265 (1976).
34. Id. at 255-57, 360 N.E.2d at 946-48, 392 N.Y.S.2d at 268-70.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 257, 360 N.E.2d at 947, 392 N.Y.S.2d at 269.
37. 356 F. Supp. 991 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
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the government of India was purchasing equipment from Dynam-
ics. A standby letter of credit,38 issued by Dynamics' bank, was
payable to India upon receipt by the issuer of a document signed
by the Indian President stating that Dynamics had defaulted on its
obligations under the contract. War between India and Pakistan
broke out.3 9 As a result of a United States embargo, India claimed
that there was no delivery (which was a breach by Dynamics) and
presented the issuer with the documents required under the letter.
Dynamics, then bankrupt, claimed that India's demand for pay-
ment was fraudulent because the contract provided for delivery at
Dynamics' plant, and the goods were so tendered. The court found
that these facts were sufficient grounds to enjoin the bank from
honoring its letter.40
It is questionable whether fraud existed at all in the Dynamics
case. Certainly the beneficiary in Dynamics was not guilty of
committing the grave and intentionally fraudulent acts which were
committed by the beneficiaries in Sztejn and United Bank. 41 Most
surprising in the Dynamics case is the court's statement that the
fraud necessary for an injunction against honor need not be inten-
tional.4 2 Fraud, according to the Dynamics court, has a broad
meaning when the action is in equity and includes "all acts, omis-
sions and concealments which involve a breach of a legal or equita-
ble duty .... "43
This broad, "equitable" standard is a questionable step away
from the long standing independent contracts rule 44 as it sanctions
injunctive relief where the beneficiary's behavior might be more
properly characterized as defective performance in the underlying
transaction. If this broader interpretation of fraud is adopted by the
courts, an injunction against honor action could be used as a device
38. See note 1 supra.
39. See 356 F. Supp. at 994; N.Y. Times, Dec. 1, 1971, at 3, col. 1.
40. 356 F. Supp. at 1000.
41. See notes 14-18 & 33-35 supra and accompanying text.
42. 356 F. Supp. at 998 (quoting S.E.C. v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc.,
375 U.S. 180, 193-94 (1963)). Courts of equity have long used the term "fraud" to en-
compass several types of malfeasance. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
TORTS § 105, at 685-86 (4th ed. 1971). Nevertheless, considering the independent
contracts rule that an issuer's obligation be independent from the underlying transac-
tion, the issuer should only be enjoined when the fraud is "intentional and egre-
gious." Harfield, Enjoining Letter of Credit Transactions, 95 BANKING L.J. 596, 596
(1978).
43. 356 F. Supp. at 998-99.
44. See notes 9-14 supra and accompanying text.
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for litigating breach of the underlying contract. Such a result would
severely weaken the independence of contracts rule, and thus, the
utility of the letter of credit as a certain and reliable tool for
facilitating complex commercial transactions would be dramatically
diminished.
A Pennsylvania court, in Intraworld Indus. Inc. v. Girard
Trust Bank,4 5 did not follow this broad "equitable" standard but
rather set forth a well-reasoned policy of granting injunctions in
only those situations where the wrongdoing (fraud) of the benefi-
ciary has "so vitiated the entire transaction" that the legitimate
purposes of the independence of the issuer's obligation would no
longer be served.4 6 The Intraworld court stated "[a] court of eq-
uity has the limited duty of guaranteeing that the beneficiary not
be allowed to take unconscientious advantage of the situation and
run off with the plaintiff's [customer's] money ... [upon documen-
tation supplied to the issuer] which has absolutely no basis in
fact. "47
In this Pennsylvania case, a standby letter of credit was pay-
able to the beneficiary upon the issuer's receipt of a statement
made by the lessor-beneficiary prescribing that the lessee-customer
had not paid the rent due on a resort hotel lease. When the issuing
bank received this statement from the beneficiary, the lessee-
customer, claiming that all the rent had been timely paid, sought
to enjoin the bank from making payment. 4 In affirming the deci-
sion below denying injunctive relief, the court stated that the situa-
tion was strictly a contract dispute which, according to the inde-
pendence of contracts rule, should have no effect on the issuer's
payment obligation.4 9
In Intraworld the court clearly defined the situations which
warrant an injunction against honor. The court perceived that the
certainty which flows from the independence of the issuer's obliga-
tion from the underlying transaction gives the letter of credit its
utility. 50 The court believed that it should only interfere in a letter
of credit transaction (by prohibiting an issuer from making pay-
45. 461 Pa. 343, 336 A.2d 316 (1975).
46. Id. at 359, 336 A.2d at 324-25.
47. Id. at 359, 336 A.2d at 325 (quoting Dynamics Corp. of America v. Citizens
& S. Nat'l Bank, 356 F.2d 991, 999 (N.D. Ga. 1973)).
48. Id. at 345-48, 336 A.2d at 318-21.
49. Id. at 358-59, 336 A.2d at 324-25.
50. Id. at 357, 336 A.2d at 323.
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ment) when the beneficiary has acted in such a reprehensible man-
ner in the underlying transaction that allowing him to receive pay-
ment under the letter would be unconscionable.5 1 Courts then,
should be able to point to fraudulent conduct of the beneficiary in
the underlying transaction which would "shock the conscience" be-
fore it enjoins honor.
United Bank Ltd. v. Cambridge Sporting Goods Corp.52 and
Sztejn v. J. Henry Schroder Banking Corp.53 provide examples of
such "conscience-shocking" fraud. 54 Of the various approaches
taken by courts in injunction against honor litigation (in which ac-
tive fraud is alleged) the view which best preserves the integrity of
letter of credit transactions is one which only enjoins honor upon
proof that the fraud perpetrated is "reprehensible." Exceptions
should be made to the independent contracts rule only when en-
forcement of this rule would be unconscionable.
III. PROSPECTIVE FRAUD: THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION
AND INJUNCTIONS AGAINST HONOR
At the time of the Iranian revolution, United States companies
had billions of dollars in contracts outstanding with the Iranian gov-
ernment and its agencies. 55
In the typical situation the Iranian Government-purchaser of
equipment or services-would have made an advance payment to
the United States contractor. 56 In return, the Iranian purchasers
would demand a guarantee of repayment of the advance as well as
a performance guarantee equal to ten percent of the amount of the
contract. 57 These guarantees, made by Iranian banks, were payable
to the Iranian purchasers upon the guarantor's receipt of the Iran-
ian purchaser's statement that the United States contractor had de-
faulted. 58 The Iranian (guarantor) bank required that the United
51. Id. at 359, 336 A.2d at 324-25.
52. 41 N.Y.2d 254, 360 N.E.2d 943, 392 N.Y.S.2d 265 (1976).
53. 177 Misc. 719, 31 N.Y.S.2d 631 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
54. See notes 14-18 & 33-35 supra and accompanying text.
55. Rendell, supra note 6, at 73.
56. E.g., KMW Int'l v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 606 F.2d 10, 12-13 (2d Cir.
1979); see Rendell, supra note 6, at 73.
57. United Technologies Corp. v. Citibank, N.A., 469 F. Supp 473, 475-77
(S.D.N.Y. 1979); Watkins-Johnson Co. v. Wells Fargo Bank, No. C79-0121 SAW, slip
op. at 1-2 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 27, 1979); Rendell, supra note 6, at 73.
58. See, e.g., KMW Int'l v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 606 F.2d 10, 12-13 (2d
Cir. 1979); see Rendell, supra note 6, at 73, 75.
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States contractor have a United States bank issue a standby letter
of credit 59 with the Iranian bank as the beneficiary. 60 The letter was
payable upon a declaration by the guaranteeing Iranian bank that it
had been called upon to make payment to the Iranian purchaser
under the guarantee. 61 The United States issuer-bank, as in all let-
ter of credit situations, 62 would obtain an indemnification from its
customer, the United States contractor. 63
As the revolutionary Iranian Government was so anti-Ameri-
can the United States contractors feared that either the Iranian
(guarantor) banks would call for payment of the letters without
receiving a demand for payment under the guarantee or that the
Iranian purchasers would demand the guarantee payment despite
the fact that the United States contractor had not defaulted. 64 If
payment under the letter of credit were made, the United States
contractor would have to indemnify its bank. Since it was custom-
ary for the underlying United States-Iranian contract to provide
that Iranian law governed the transaction and that disputes were to
be resolved by Iranian courts, 65 the United States contractor's only
recourse would be to sue the Iranian bank or Iranian purchaser in
an Iranian Court. Seeking to avoid litigation in Iran, the United
States contractors petitioned the United States' courts to prohibit
their banks from making payment under the letters of credit. 66
They argued that due to the political chaos and anti-American sen-
timent in Iran, there was a strong likelihood that the guarantees
and letters of credit would be fraudulently called. 67
59. See note 1 supra.
60. See, e.g. KMW Int'l v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 606 F.2d 10, 12-13 (2d
Cir. 1979); see Rendell, supra note 6, at 73, 75.
61. Rendell, supra note 6, at 73. The amount of the letter would correspond to
the amount of the guarantee. Id.
62. See note 1 supra.
63. Rendell, supra note 6, at 73.
64. See, e.g., KMW Int'l v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 606 F.2d 10, 12-13 (2d
Cir. 1979); see Rendell, supra note 6, at 73, 75.
65. See, e.g., American Bell Int'l, Inc. v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., No.
3157/79, slip op. at 2 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co., N.Y. Mar. 26, 1979).
66. See, e.g., United Technologies Corp. v. Citibank, N.A., 469 F. Supp. 473,
474 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); American Bell Int'l, Inc. v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co.,
No. 3157/79, slip op. at 2 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co., N.Y. Mar. 26, 1979). These United
States contractors included such corporate giants as A.T. & T., Pan Am. and United
Technologies. Rendell, supra note 6, at 73.
67. See, e.g., Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. Bank Melli Iran, No. 48411, slip
op. at 9 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 1979); American Bell Int'l, Inc. v. Manufacturers Hanover
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Typically, the letter of credit was payable to the Iranian (guar-
antor) bank upon the United States bank's receipt of a statement
from the Iranian bank prescribing that the Iranian bank had been
called upon by the "Imperial Government of Iran" to make pay-
ment under the guarantee. 68 The United States contractors alleged
that, as the "Imperial Government of Iran" no longer existed, any
demand by the Iranian (guarantor) bank for payment under the let-
ter of credit would necessarily be legally insufficient. 69 The courts,
in rejecting this reasoning, stated that the United States recogni-
tion of the present government of Iran as the de jure government
is binding on the courts and therefore the present government of
Iran succeeded to the rights and position of the former Imperial
Government. 70
As it was reported that many of the Iranian banks were closed
and their books and records were destroyed, the United States
contractors also argued that there was a substantial risk that any
demand by the Iranian (guarantor) bank would be improper and
fraudulent and, as such, the United States banks should be en-
joined from honoring their letters. 71 The United States contractors
stated specifically that, although the Iranians had not yet demand-
ed payment under the letters of credit, the situation in Iran was
chaotic, and "unauthorized persons" might gain control of Iranian
banking institutions and fraudulently demand payment of the let-
ters of credit. 72 This chaotic situation amounted to "prospective
Trust Co., No. 3157/79, slip op. at 5 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co., Mar. 26, 1979). See also
Rendell, supra note 6, at 73-75.
68. See, e.g., Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. Bank Melli Iran, No. 48411, slip
op. at 9 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 1979); American Bell Int'l, Inc. v. Manufacturers Hanover
Trust Co., No. 3157/79, slip op. at 5 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co., N.Y. Mar. 26, 1979). See also
Rendell, supra note 6, at 73-75.
69. See, e.g. Watkins-Johnson Co. v. Wells Fargo Bank, No. C79-0121, slip op.
at 5-6 (N.D. Cal., Feb. 27, 1979); American Bell Int'l, Inc. v. Manufacturers Hanover
Trust Co., No. 3157/79, slip op. at 4-5, 11 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co., N.Y. Mar. 26, 1979). See
70. See, e.g., Watkins-Johnson Co. v. Wells Fargo Bank, No. C79-0121, slip. op.
at 5-6 (N.D. Cal., Feb. 27, 1979); American Bell Int'l, Inc. v. Manufacturers Hanover
Trust Co., No. 3157/79, slip op. at 4-5, 11 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co., N.Y. Mar. 26, 1979). See
also Letter of Secretary of State Muskie to Prime Minister Rajai (Aug. 28, 1980), re-
printed in N.Y. Times, Sept. 10, 1980, at A8, col. 1.
71. See, e.g. KMW Int'l v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 606 F.2d 10, 13-19 (2d
Cir. 1979). See Rendell, supra note 6, at 73, 75.
72. See, e.g., Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. Bank Melli Iran, No. 48411, slip
op. at 5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 1979); United Technologies Corp. v. Citibank, N.A., 469
F. Supp. 473, 479 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
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fraud," according to the United States contractors, and thus
grounds for an injunction against honor were present. 73 The courts,
however, responded unsympathetically to this argument and stated
that mere suspicion and general apprehension that a demand will
be fraudulent are not sufficient causes for an injunction against
honor. 74
A federal district court in Pan American Airways Inc. v. Bank
Melli Iran75 looked to the 1941 case of Nadler v. Mei Loong Corp.
of China, Ltd. 76 when it decided this "speculative fraud issue" and
stated that it must be shown that the demand by the beneficiary
will necessarily be fraudulent in order for a court to enjoin
honor. 77
In the Nadler case New York purchasers of furs from Chinese
fur exporters had Manufacturers Trust Company issue a commer-
cial letter of credit in favor of the Chinese seller's New York agent.
The agent presented bills of lading and other documents called for
under the letter to Manufacturers Trust Company. Although the
beneficiary (the Chinese seller's agent) had not yet demanded pay-
ment under the letter of credit, the New York purchasers sought to
enjoin Manufacturers Trust Company from honoring the drafts.
They argued that, as a result of the United States and Japanese war
embargoes, it was not possible for the goods to be shipped as the
drafts stated and therefore, any documents presented to the bank
would necessarily be fraudulent. 78 The court agreed, and prohib-
ited Manufacturers Trust Company from making payment under
the letter. 79
The courts in the Iranian letter of credit cases wisely rejected
the prospective fraud argument-that honor should be enjoined
because there was a substantial risk that a demand for payment
73. See, e.g., Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. Bank Melli Iran, No. 48411, slip
op. at 5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 1979); United Technologies Corp. v. Citibank, N.A., 469
F. Supp. 473, 478-79 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); see Rendell, supra note 6, at 73-75.
74. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. Bank Melli Iran, No. 48411, slip op. at 9-11
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 1979); Watkins-Johnson Co. v. Wells Fargo Bank, No. C79-0121,
slip op. at 6 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 27, 1979); American Bell Int'l, Inc. v. Manufacturers
Hanover Trust Co., No. 3157/79, slip op. at 8-9 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co., N.Y. Mar. 26,
1979).
75. No. 48411 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 1979).
76. 177 Misc. 263, 30 N.Y.S.2d 323 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
77. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. Bank Melli Iran, No. 48411, slip op. at 9-13
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 1979).
78. 177 Misc. at 264, 30 N.Y.S.2d at 323.
79. Id. at 264-68, 30 N.Y.S.2d at 323.
[Vol. 4:161
INJUNCTIONS AGAINST HONOR
would be fraudulent. If a United States court did enjoin an issuer
from honoring its letter, not as a result of a fraudulent act
committed by the beneficiary, but due to a fraudulent act the court
thinks that the beneficiary might commit, foreign merchants would
be very wary about requesting a letter of credit from a United
States bank.80 This result would, of course, be very damaging to
the United States banking and business communities.81 The courts
can avoid this result by enjoining honor only in those situations (in
which the argument of prospective fraud is raised) where the facts
are such that, although no demand for payment under the letter by
the beneficiary has been made, any demand in the future would
"necessarily be fraudulent."
CONCLUSION
The utility of the letter of credit in facilitating complex inter-
national and domestic commercial transactions stems from the in-
dependence of the issuer's obligation to the beneficiary from the
underlying transaction. If the letter of credit is to retain its utility,
the situations in which a court prohibits the issuer from making
80. Gibbs & Hill, Inc. v. Chemical Bank, No. 03637/79, slip op. at 12 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. Co., N.Y. June, 1979).
[TIhere is insufficient reason to, in effect, discredit the international letter of
credit . . . in this jurisdiction. It might well develop-if banks in this juris-
diction are readily restrained from honoring irrevocable letters of
credit-that other foreign nations and corporations will insist that any letters
of credit issued in the course of trade be issued by a bank from a jurisdiction
other than New York. This could have a most serious effect on the world's
major banking center and is an additional factor to be considered in balanc-
ing the equities.
Id.
81. Id. One student commentator has suggested that injunctions should have
been granted in the Iranian letter of credit cases where the government of Iran was
the beneficiary. Comment, Enjoining the International Standby Letter of Credit:
The Iranian Letter of Credit Cases, 21 HARV. INT'L L.J. 189, 246 (1980). The ration-
ale for this pro-injunction argument was that "prospective losses due to a sovereign's
breach of its duty of state responsibility to aliens are not assumed by the bank cus-
tomers and should provide for an injunction against honor." Id. This analysis entirely
omits to consider the situation of the issuing bank if an injunction is granted. If the
bank's international letters of credit were enjoined by a United States court, the bank
would nevertheless be subject to liability under the letters in foreign jurisdictions
where it has assets. More importantly, the bank's reputation for commercial honor
would be severely damaged when foreign nationals learned that the United States
issuing bank was enjoined because of a "political situation" outside the United
States.
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payment under the letter must be very carefully and narrowly
drawn.
In the cases where the customer seeks an injunction against
honor due to the beneficiary's fraudulent conduct in the underlying
transaction, the courts should grant injunctions only where the
beneficiary's conduct is so reprehensible that it would shock the
conscience of any reasonable person. In the cases where the cus-
tomer seeks to enjoin honor on the grounds of prospective fraud,
the courts should only grant injunctive relief where a future de-
mand for payment under the letter of credit by the beneficiary
would necessarily be fraudulent.
Stephen P. McLaughlin
